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THOUSANDS OF HALF-LIVES TO GO: WEIGHING THE 
RISKS OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL STORAGE 
 
Amanda Matos* 
 
In 2012, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, and in light 
of executive and congressional roadblocks to developing a reliable 
plan for away-from-reactor nuclear waste storage, the D.C. Cir-
cuit ruled in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission that 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (“NRC”) plan for nuclear 
storage was unacceptable and required revision. The court ruled 
that the NRC must assess the long-term risks of storing nuclear 
waste at or near nuclear power plants. In response, the NRC is-
sued a draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement (“draft 
GEIS”) which fundamentally altered its thirty-year position on 
waste storage, claiming that at-reactor waste storage for indefi-
nitely long periods of time could be accomplished within accepta-
ble safety limits. This note argues that the NRC’s at-reactor waste 
storage risk projections in the draft GEIS are based on a flawed 
analysis. 
 Specifically, this note demonstrates that the NRC has (1) fallen 
short in its determination of the probability of the occurrence of a 
disaster, and (2) failed to provide a reasonable method of tying 
this probability to the associated environmental consequences. The 
NRC purports to have determined that at-reactor waste storage is 
safe for an eternal period of time, despite not more than seventy 
years of storage experience. 
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015. This note is dedicated to my 
husband, Yacob Rahav, who I will love longer than the half-life of plutonium. 
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also thank the members of the JLP staff for their careful edits and feedback. 
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 This note tracks the history of severe nuclear disasters vis-à-vis 
the prediction of future events, and analyzes judicial assessments 
of challenges to NRC policy. This note argues that the NRC violat-
ed the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), which re-
quires that federal agencies properly assess the environmental 
risks of their actions, by inaccurately reporting environmental 
risks to the public. This note concludes that, given the inadequacy 
of the NRC risk assessment, the NRC failed to comply with the 
court’s mandate. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Wearing a surgical mask, Ms. Hiroko Watabe visits her home 
once per month, provided that she is willing to assume the risk of 
exposure to highly radioactive materials.1 Along with 83,000 other 
people who face the same constraints, she was displaced by the 
2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan.2 Although there were 
major nuclear accidents within the thirty-two years prior to 
Fukushima, including the Three Mile Accident in the United States 
and the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine, many policymakers 
predicted that events like the Fukushima disaster would occur 
extraordinarily infrequently.3  
Nuclear power plants generate electric power by using heat 
generated by the decay of enriched uranium.4 About 5 years after 
                                                            
1 Martin Fackler, Japan’s Nuclear Refugees, Still Stuck in Limbo, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/world/asia/ 
japans-nuclear-refugees-still-stuck-in-limbo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
2 Id. 
3 AJ SOFTWARE & MULTIMEDIA, Major Nuclear Power Plant Accidents, 
ATOMIC ARCHIVE, http://www.atomicarchive.com/Reports/Japan/ 
Accidents.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). The Three Mile Island accident 
occurred in 1979, and the Chernobyl accident occurred in 1986. Id. 
4 Uranium Enrichment, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Conversion-Enrichment-and-
Fabrication/Uranium-Enrichment/ (last updated Aug. 2014). The splitting of 
uranium during the process of nuclear fission results in small fragments whose 
total mass is slightly less than that of the original uranium atom. INST. FOR 
ENERGY & ENVTL. RESEARCH, Basics of Nuclear Physics and Fission,  
http://ieer.org/resource/factsheets/basics-nuclear-physics-fission/ (last updated 
May 2012). The “missing mass” is converted into vast amounts of energy, as 
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fresh nuclear fuel is inserted into the reactor, it is no longer 
efficient for energy generation; such spent nuclear fuel (SNF) must 
then be removed from the reactor.5 SNF, the highly toxic 
byproduct of nuclear fuel, remains radioactive for thousands of 
years after it is removed from a nuclear reactor core.6 Since SNF 
emits lethal amounts of radiation and generates intense heat 
following its removal from the reactor, it must be isolated in 
massive pools of water.7 At each nuclear power plant site, tons of 
SNF awaiting long-term safe disposal have accumulated in these 
pools.8 
                                                            
called for by Einstein’s famous equation, E=mc2. Id. In addition, neutrons 
generated during this process convert some uranium into plutonium. What is 
Uranium? How Does it Work?, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-fuel-cycle/introduction/what-is-Uranium--How-Does-
it-Work-/ (last updated Mar. 2014) [hereinafter What is Uranium?]. Some of this 
highly toxic plutonium is present in nuclear fuel upon removal from the reactor. 
See id. (discussing the production of plutonium by nuclear fission); see also Jan 
A. Gevers Leuven, A Medical Look at Plutonium, 
http://www.nvmp.org/pluto4.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (explaining the toxic 
effects of plutonium). 
5 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON AMERICA’S NUCLEAR FUTURE, REPORT TO THE 
SECRETARY OF ENERGY 10 (Jan. 2012) [hereinafter BLUE RIBBON COMM’N 
REPORT], available at http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/ 
media/filefolder/BRC_FinalReport_Jan2012.pdf. 
6 Id. at 10–11. 
7 John W. Rachow, The Growing Problem of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 
PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP. (2014), http://www.psr.org/environment-and-
health/environmental-health-policy-institute/responses/the-growing-problem-of-
spent-nuclear-fuel.html. According to the Institute for Policy Studies,”[s]pent 
fuel rods give off about 1 million rems (10,000 Sv) of radiation per hour at a 
distance of one foot — enough radiation to kill people in a matter of seconds.” 
Robert Alvarez, INST. FOR POLICY STUDIES, Spent Nuclear Fuel Pools in the 
U.S. 1 (May 2011) available at http://www.ips-dc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/spent_nuclear_fuel_pools_in_the_US-final.pdf. 
Moreover, the SNF could unleash a catastrophic fire if the fuel is exposed to air. 
Id. at 18. In addition, “[a] severe pool fire could render about 188 square miles 
around the nuclear reactor uninhabitable, cause as many as 28,000 cancer 
fatalities, and spur $59 billion in damage.” Id.; see also discussion infra Parts 
I.A, C.  
8 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. Roughly 75 percent 
of SNF in the U.S. is stored in pools to cool and shield the radioactivity of the 
fuel. Id. at 11, 14; see also discussion infra Part I.A. 
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Ongoing operation at each of the 104 commercial reactor sites 
in the U.S. continually generates substantial quantities of SNF.9 In 
order to manage the quantity and hazards of SNF, Congress passed 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), which called for 
the establishment of permanent underground repositories 
(“geologic sites”), where SNF would be stored after an initial 
period of pool storage.10 These geologic sites were considered a 
safer alternative than long-term on-site storage of waste at nuclear 
power plants.11 Subsequently, Congress amended the NWPA to 
designate a single permanent repository inside Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada.12 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which 
oversees and licenses commercial reactors and nuclear waste 
storage facilities,13 intended to house and monitor SNF at Yucca 
Mountain for a period of up to one million years.14 The Yucca 
Mountain plan has been highly contested on both political and 
practical grounds, and after thirty years of repeated postponements, 
it is now possible that this repository will never be built.15 In the 
absence of a definitive Yucca Mountain plan, there is a pressing 
need for a storage solution. The current practice of storing SNF at 
nuclear sites has widely been considered an unacceptable long-
term solution.16  
                                                            
9 Id. at 14. 
10 Id. at 20. The Department of Energy is responsible for designating sites 
for the establishment of permanent geologic repositories. Id. at 22. These 
designations are subject to the NRC’s approval. Id.; see also discussion infra 
Part I.B.  
11 Id. at 20. 
12 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No 100-203, Title 
V, § 5011(a), (1987) (amending 42 U.S.C. §10172). 
13 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
LICENSING PROCESS 1 (July 2004), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0298/br0298r2.pdf. 
14 Waste Confidence- Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 56776, 56797 (proposed Sept. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 
51). 
15 See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 23–24. The 
Department of Energy continually delayed its application for a permanent 
repository as a result of legal challenges and lack of funding from Congress. Id. 
at 23; see also discussion infra at Part I.B. 
16 See, e.g., BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5 at iv, 10–11, 26–
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The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 established the NRC 
as an independent agency to regulate the nuclear industry.17 The 
NRC commissioners are nominated for a five-year term by the 
President, and must be confirmed by the Senate.18 
Beginning in 1984, the NRC issued a set of guiding principles 
for safe SNF management referred to as the Waste Confidence 
Decision (WCD).19 The WCD provided assurance that after an 
initial period of at-reactor storage (e.g., thirty years), SNF would 
be transferred to a permanent repository.20 Although courts tend to 
defer to the NRC’s findings, in New York v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission21 in 2012, the D.C. Circuit broke new 
ground in calling for the NRC to account for the possibility that a 
permanent repository will never be established.22 The court 
mandated that the NRC assess the risks involved in permanent 
storage in the absence of Yucca Mountain.23 In response, the NRC 
issued a draft Generic Environmental Impact Statement (draft 
GEIS), in which it provided an assessment of the environmental 
effects of short-term, long-term, and permanent storage of nuclear 
waste at or near nuclear power plant sites.24 The NRC based its 
report on a controversial risk assessment technique, which purports 
                                                            
27. 
17 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, THE NRC: WHO WE ARE AND 
WHAT WE DO 2, available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1424/ 
ML14241A663.pdf. 
18 Id. at 4.  
19 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 473 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). Based on the original WCD assurances: “1) safe disposal in a mined 
geologic repository is technically feasible, 2) such a repository will be available 
by 2007-2009, 3) waste will be managed safely until the repository is available, 
4) SNF can be stored safely at nuclear plants for at least thirty years beyond the 
licensed life of each plant, and 5) safe, independent storage will be made 
available, if needed.” Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 471. 
22 Id. at 473.  
23 See id. 
24 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, WASTE CONFIDENCE GENERIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: DRAFT REPORT FOR COMMENT xxii 
(2013) [hereinafter DRAFT GEIS], available at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ 
ML1322/ML13224A106.pdf. 
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to mathematically predict the likelihood and consequences of a 
nuclear accident.25 Despite the risks of nuclear waste storage, the 
commission’s draft GEIS is optimistic, and concludes that long-
term environmental effects of continued on-site storage will 
generally be minimal.26 
This Note argues that the NRC’s draft GEIS contains profound 
weaknesses because of uncertainties, oversimplifications and frank 
inaccuracies in its risk assessment and presentation. Accordingly, 
this Note further argues that (1) NRC failed to comply with the 
D.C. Circuit’s ruling in New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, and (2) that future challenges should be subject to 
greater judicial scrutiny.27  
Since the NRC did not sufficiently account for the risks of 
storing SNF in the vicinity of a nuclear reactor, the draft GEIS was 
not a legally satisfactory outcome of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in 
New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In particular, 
the NRC’s report’s projections assume the ability to store SNF far 
beyond what has ever been accomplished. Nuclear waste has never 
been stored for more than approximately seventy years,28 yet the 
NRC separately analyzes and forecasts safe storage for each of a 
160- to 240-year timeframe and for an unlimited timeframe, which 
the NRC refers to as “long-term” and “indefinite” storage, 
respectively.29 Furthermore, the draft GEIS oversimplifies risk 
quantification by reducing the presentation of risk assessment to 
one of three words: “small,” “moderate,” and “large.”30 Based on 
this nomenclature, the NRC concludes that the risk of major 
environmental impacts with continued SNF storage will generally 
be “small.”31 
                                                            
25 Id. at xxviii. 
26 Id. at xlii–xliii, liii–liv. 
27 See infra Part V. 
28 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 19 (explaining that 
“spent fuel and [high level waste] has been produced in the United Stated since 
the 1940s"). 
29 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xxvi, xlii–xliii, liii–liv. 
30 Id. at xxviii. 
31 Id. at xlii–xliii, liii–liv. 
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The D.C. Circuit’s refusal to defer to the NRC’s WCD safety 
assurances in New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission32 
can be considered a natural result of 2011 Fukushima accident, in 
which massive amounts of radiation were released into the 
environment. The draft GEIS presents another flawed SNF storage 
strategy, and will likely face similar legal challenges.33 Given the 
uncertainties and oversimplifications in the draft GEIS’s risk 
assessment, these future challenges should be subject to greater 
judicial scrutiny.34 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the hazards of 
generating and storing nuclear waste. This section also discusses 
the environmental effects of SNF storage. In particular, it reviews 
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, severe nuclear 
accidents that continue to influence environmental decision 
making. In addition, this section examines plans for developing a 
national repository in the U.S, and the ensuing standstill. Part II 
provides case law background and an analysis of New York v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, a landmark case which led to the 
NRC’s development of the draft GEIS. Part III discusses and 
analyzes the NRC’s risk assessment in the draft GEIS, and 
explores judicial review of the NRC’s risk assessment approach. 
Part IV provides a critique of the draft GEIS and analyzes both the 
deficiencies involved in the NRC’s risk assessment, as well as its 
oversimplified presentation of risk to the public. Part V argues that 
the draft GEIS should be subject to greater judicial scrutiny. Part 
                                                            
32 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
33 Eric Schneiderman, who spearheaded the lawsuit in New York v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, stated that the draft GEIS is “significantly 
flawed,” because the report fails to adequately account for the risks involved 
with storing SNF. Eric Scheiderman, Testimony of N.Y. State Attorney Gen. 
Eric T. Schneiderman on the Waste Confidence Draft Generic Envtl. Impact 
Statement (DGEIS) and Proposed Rule (Oct. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Janice%20Dean%20Testimony%2010.30.13.5.pdf In 
addition, as of January 31, 2013, there were nine pending legal challenges to the 
NRC regarding their environmental decision-making. U.S. Nuclear Reg. 
Comm’n, Annual Report on Court Litigation 1–12 (Jan. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/ secys/2013/2013-
0013scy.pdf. 
34 See infra Part V. 
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VI concludes that the NRC failed to comply with the mandate of 
New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and that there 
should be a less deferential standard of review for the NRC’s 
findings as a result of the Fukushima disaster.  
 
I. BACKGROUND ON THE RISKS OF STORING NUCLEAR WASTE 
 
A. Short-Term Methods of Storing Spent Nuclear Fuel 
 
SNF is an extremely hot byproduct of nuclear fuel that is no 
longer energy efficient, and remains radioactive for thousands of 
years.35 SNF is highly hazardous: “[c]lose proximity to a single 10-
year-old spent fuel assembly would deliver a fatal whole-body 
radiation dose in about three minutes.”36 Each year, the nuclear 
industry produces 2000 to 2400 metric tons of spent fuel, which is 
typically stored, cooled, and contained37 in spent fuel pools at 
nuclear power plants. Unless SNF is adequately cooled, the heat 
that the fuel generates is intense enough to ignite the fuel and 
disseminate highly radioactive matter into the atmosphere.38 
Failure to contain SNF poses the risks of pool fires and leakage of 
radioactive contents.39 Furthermore, these spent fuel pools have 
limited storage capacity.40 Because of the safety risks involved and 
the limited storage capacity, spent fuel pools were built with the 
understanding that pool storage would be temporary.41 SNF has 
been stored in pools for decades, and as of January 2012, 
                                                            
35 Rachow, supra note 7. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 23–24. 
38 Eli Kintisch, Contention over Risk of Fire from Spent Fuel Pools, 
SCIENCEMAG.ORG (March 16, 2011, 7:16 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/ 
2011/03/contention-over-risk-fire-spent-fuel-pools. 
39 See New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 475, 477 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (explaining that pool fires may result if the pump which must 
continuously supply cooled water fails).  
40 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: PRODUCTION, 
STORAGE, DISPOSAL 10 (May 2002), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/nuregs/brochures/br0216/r2/br0216r2.pdf. 
41 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 33. 
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amounted to 50,000 metric tons, or 110 million pounds.42 
After the first few years of obligatory pool storage to cool the 
SNF, there are two options for further SNF storage: (1) ongoing 
pool storage; or (2) dry storage.43 Dry storage involves encasing 
the fuel in concrete and steel.44 This is considered a more secure 
and thus preferable option to continued pool storage.45 Less than 
twenty-five percent of the nation’s SNF has been removed to dry 
storage,46 but this percentage is expected to increase because SNF 
pools are full or near capacity.47 However, SNF can only be stored 
in dry casks for roughly 100 years,48 and therefore this storage 
method cannot be a permanent solution.49 A long-term safe and 
reliable storage solution for SNF is essential, but remains 
unavailable.  
 
B. The Need for Permanent Storage 
 
SNF contains radioactive plutonium, which is generated during 
the nuclear fuel cycle50 and remains radioactive for tens of 
thousands of years.51 Plutonium gradually decays into non-
radioactive elements.52 The time required for this decay is 
                                                            
42 Id. at 11. One metric ton is approximately 2200 pounds. Id. at 14. An 
additional 15,000 tons of SNF has accumulated in dry storage amounting to a 
total of 65,000 tons of SNF. See id. at 11. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 34.  
46 Id. 
47 INT’L PANEL ON FISSILE MATERIALS, SPENT FUEL FROM NUCLEAR 
POWER REACTORS 12–15 (June 2011), available at http://fissilematerials.org/ 
library/ipfm-spent-fuel-overview-june-2011.pdf.  
48 Rachow, supra note 7. 
49 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, RADIOACTIVE WASTE: FACT SHEET 1–
2 (April 2007), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-
sheets/radwaste.pdf. 
50 What is Uranium?, supra note 4. 
51 RADIOACTIVE WASTE: FACT SHEET, supra note 49, at 1–2. 
52 Id. at 2. Robert Busby, The United States’s Failure to Establish a High-
Level Nuclear Waste Storage Facility is Threatening its Ability to Effectively 
Support Nuclear Nonproliferation, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 449, 454 
(1996). 
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measured by the “half-life,”53 which, for one form of plutonium in 
SNF, is 24,000 years.54 Other components of nuclear fuel can have 
even longer half-lives,55 rendering the SNF dangerous to humans 
for still longer periods of time. Congress and the NRC therefore 
planned a permanent repository with the understanding that no 
containment structure in the form of pools or dry storage could 
possibly be certifiable for this amount of time.56  
In 1982, Congress passed the NWPA,57 which mandated that 
the Department of Energy designate a permanent site for 
underground storage of high-level radioactive waste,58 subject to 
the NRC’s approval.59 A 1987 amendment to the NWPA 
designated Yucca Mountain in Nevada as the sole site for a 
national geologic repository, with a 1998 deadline for acceptance 
of SNF.60 The NRC provided assurances that the repository would 
provide one million years of storage.61  
In light of political and practical complexities, this deadline has 
been repeatedly extended.62 In 2008, the Department of Energy 
submitted its first license application to the NRC for operating a 
national repository at Yucca Mountain.63 However, the Obama 
Administration has opposed the development of a permanent 
                                                            
53 Radiation and Life, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, (Dec. 2012) 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Radiation-and-
Health/Radiation-and-Life/. The half-life is the time for half of the radioactive 
material to become non-radioactive; after one half-life, half of the radioactivity 
is gone, and after two half-lives, three quarters is gone. Id. Only after a large 
number of half-lives is the radioactivity meaningfully depleted. See id.  
54 Busby, supra note 52. 
55 Id. 
56 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 20. 
57 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2) (2014). 
58 See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.  Underground 
storage would reduce the risks of a radioactive release, and is therefore 
considered a safer alternative to above-ground storage of SNF.  Id. at 27, 29. 
59 42 U.S.C. § 10132(b)(1)(A) (2014). 
60 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 23. 
61 See Waste Confidence- Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 78 
Fed. Reg. 56776, 56805 (proposed Sept. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. 
pt. 51).  
62 Id. at 23–24. 
63 Id. at 23. 
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repository,64 and thus submitted budget proposals in 2009 that 
discontinued funding for the Yucca Mountain repository.65 The 
Administration also moved to withdraw the license application for 
Yucca Mountain.66 The NRC did not grant the motion to withdraw, 
but suspended licensing proceedings for Yucca Mountain in 
2011.67  
Because of the NRC’s inaction, in In re Aiken County,68 in 
2013, South Carolina and Washington State69 filed a complaint 
against the NRC in the D.C. Circuit on the grounds that the 
licensing proceedings should continue, which would enable the 
transfer of SNF from local storage to the Yucca Mountain 
repository.70 In response, the court granted a writ of mandamus 
against the NRC, ordering them to decide whether to grant the 
Department of Energy’s application for licensing a repository at 
Yucca Mountain.71 The court ruled that the NRC, as an executive 
agency, was obligated to proceed with the licensing process, but 
acknowledged that Congress has the power to discontinue funding 
or suspend licensing for Yucca Mountain.72 Since this ruling, the 
federal government’s Yucca Mountain plan remains in limbo.73 
The failure to actualize the Yucca Mountain plan was the basis 
for the plaintiffs’ action in New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
                                                            
64 The Obama administration’s explanation is that Yucca Mountain is not a 
feasible option for permanent storage. TODD GARVEY, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERV., CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTAIN 3 (June 4, 2012), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41675.pdf. 
65 Id. at 3; see also id. at summary. In response, Congress has restricted 
funding for the project. Id. at 3. 
66 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 23. 
67 GARVEY, supra note 64, at summary. The NRC indicated that it 
suspended the proceedings due to lack of funding from Congress. In re Aiken 
County, 725 F.3d 255, 387 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
68 Aiken County, 725 F.3d at 385. 
69 Various entities and individuals in South Carolina and Washington were 
petitioners as well. Id.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 385–86. 
72 Id. at 386. 
73 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 471, 474 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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Commission,74 in which the D.C. Circuit ruled that the NRC was 
obligated to formulate a plan for long-term SNF storage—one that 
addressed the possibility that a national repository would never 
become available.75 In response, the NRC issued the draft GEIS, 
which was required to comply with the court’s mandate.76 
 
C. History of Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Three Mile 
Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima 
 
Severe nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and 
Fukushima illustrate the potentially devastating effects of nuclear 
accidents. An analysis of these disasters is important because of 
two parallel aspects of reactor fuel and spent nuclear fuel: (1) 
toxicity and (2) risk analysis. 
First, the accidents illustrate the disastrous consequences 
resulting from the widespread dissemination of nuclear fuel during 
an accident, including death, illness, societal disruption, and 
property damage.77 Each of these incidents involved the release of 
fresh nuclear fuel; but a release of SNF, which is significantly 
more radioactive, would be even more disastrous.78 According to a 
General Accounting Office Report, “one of the most hazardous 
materials made by man is spent nuclear fuel. . . . [T]he fuel’s 
intense radioactivity can kill a person exposed directly to it within 
minutes or cause cancer in those who receive smaller doses.”79  
Second, the NRC relies on a mathematical assessment of fuel 
management safety referred to as probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA)80 for both the analysis of SNF safety81 and the analysis of 
                                                            
74 Id. at 474. 
75 Id. at 478–79, 483. 
76 See DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24. 
77 See, e.g., Melanie L. Oxhorn, The Norms of Nuclear Accidents after 
Chernobyl, 8 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 375, 377–78 (1992-1993) 
(explaining the tragic effects of the Chernobyl disaster). 
78 Rachow, supra note 7. 
79 Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-426, SPENT 
NUCLEAR FUEL: OPTIONS EXIST TO FURTHER ENHANCE SOCIETY, G.A.O. Doc. 
No. 03-426, (2003)). 
80 Probabalistic Risk Assessment (PRA), U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/risk-informed/pra.html (last updated 
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reactor safety.82 The destruction of five nuclear reactors in these 
three accidents83 is inconsistent with PRA predictions. Therefore, 
PRA-based assessments of SNF safety in the draft GEIS cannot be 
assumed to be reliable. 
The first of these accidents occurred in 1979 when a nuclear 
reactor’s core partially melted and leaked radioactive gases at 
Three Mile Island’s power plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania.84 
The Three Mile Island accident is considered the worst commercial 
nuclear reactor disaster in the United States.85 Although 
radioactive release from the accident was reportedly minimal,86 
experts contend that radioactive emissions were significantly 
higher than reported.87 In addition, although researchers found no 
                                                            
July 17, 2013). 
81 Id.; DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xxviii. 
82 See Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
869 F.2d 719, 725–26 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining NRC’s use of PRA for its 
study of reactor safety). 
83 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 708 F.3d 63, 75 
(1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that Massachusetts listed “five historical core 
damage events (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and three units at Fukushima)”). 
84 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, THREE MILE ISLAND FACT SHEET 
1 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter NRC, THREE MILE ISLAND FACT SHEET], available at 
http://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html.  
85 The Learning Network, March 28, 1979: Nuclear Accident Occurs at 
Three Mile Island Plant, N.Y. TIMES (March 28, 2012 4:02 AM), http://learning. 
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/march-28-1979-nuclear-accident-occurs-at-
three-mile-island-plant/. Moreover, health effects of the accident are reportedly 
negligible, but critics contend that the studies are incomplete. Lawrence K. 
Altman, Study of Three Mile Island Finds Negligible Increase in Cancer, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 1, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/01/us/study-of-three-
mile-island-accident-finds-negligible-increase-in-cancer.html. 
86 NRC, THREE MILE ISLAND FACT SHEET, supra note 84, at 1. Moreover, 
the EPA reported that water, soil, and plant samples in the vicinity of the reactor 
were uncontaminated. Id. However, other researchers found evidence of 
radioactive contamination in the environment. Id. 
87 Sue Sturgis, INST. FOR S. STUDIES, Investigation: Revelations about 
Three Mile Island disaster raise doubts over nuclear plant safety, FACING 
SOUTH (April 2, 2009), http://www.southernstudies.org/2009/04/post-4.html. 
For example, according to nuclear expert Arnie Gundersen, data suggest that a 
hydrogen explosion occurred following the accident, which could have 
unleashed higher doses of radiation than reported. Id. Gundersen also noted that 
the official reports underestimate the radiation release from TMI, and explained: 
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significant increase in cancer rate after the disaster,88 critics argue 
that the findings are incomplete; cancer caused by radiation can 
take decades to develop.89 The cost of the cleanup at Three Mile 
Island amounted to $1 billion and took fourteen years.90 
In 1986, a cataclysmic disaster unfolded when a nuclear reactor 
at the Chernobyl power station in Ukraine exploded, resulting in an 
extensive and intense radiation release.91 Approximately 350,000 
people in the plant’s vicinity were evacuated,92 and five million 
people were exposed to radioactive fallout.93 Moreover, the 
disaster increased the risk of cancer for those who lived in the area 
of Chernobyl at the time of the disaster, 94 and rendered substantial 
land areas uninhabitable.95 
In 2011, an earthquake and an ensuing tsunami triggered a 
severe nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Complex 
                                                            
“I think the numbers on the NRC’s website are off by a factor of 100 to 1000.” 
Id. In addition, a health physics technician stated that “[w]hat happened at TMI 
was a whole lot worse than what has been reported. Hundreds of times worse.” 
Id.  
88 Altman, supra note 85.  
89 Id. 
90 14-Year Cleanup at Three Mile Island Concludes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/15/us/14-year-cleanup-at-three-mile-
island-concludes.html. 
91 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
ACCIDENT FACT SHEET 1 (May 2013), available at http://www.nrc. gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/chernobyl-bg.html. The accident is attributed to a 
flaw in the reactor’s design and failed emergency plans. The Chernobyl 
Accident, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://chernobyl.cancer.gov/about_accident.html 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2014).  
92 Pavol Stracansky, Chernobyl Effects Could Last for Centuries, 
PRAVDA.RU (Aug. 30, 2010), http://english.pravda. ru/science/earth/30-08-
2010/114807-chernobyl_effects_could_last_fo-0/. 
93 Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, NAT’L CANCER INST., 
http://chernobyl.cancer.gov/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2014). Moreover, the number of 
casualties reported ranges from 4,056, which is considered a gross 
underestimate, to 500,000. Stracansky, supra note 92.  
94 Dr. Ilya Sandra Perlingieri, Chernobyl: The Horrific Legacy, GLOBAL 
RESEARCH (Apr. 25, 2009), http://www.globalresearch.ca/chernobyl-the-
horrific-legacy. 
95 Id.  
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in Japan.96 As a result of electrical power failures from the 
tsunami, the plant’s cooling system malfunctioned,97 resulting in 
the explosion of three nuclear reactors and the release of large 
amounts of radioactive waste.98 In the immediate aftermath of the 
disaster, 150,000 people were evacuated from the surrounding 
area.99 The effects persist, as radioactive waste from the power 
complex continues to leak into the Pacific Ocean.100 As of October 
2013, approximately 110,300 residents have not returned to their 
homes because of heightened radiation101 and it is projected that 
the cleanup will take forty years.102  
The United States is at risk of its own Fukushima.103 According 
to a New York Times report, “most of the nuclear plants in the 
[U.S.] share some or all of the risk factors that played a role at 
Fukushima.”104 These risks include plant construction along 
                                                            
96 Japan Lessons Learned, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard.html 
(last updated Sept. 15, 2014). 
97 THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEP. INVESTIGATION COMM’N, 
THE NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN 14, 30 (2012), available at 
http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/ naiic_report.pdf. 
98 Id. at 30. 
99 Id. at 19. 
100 Japan’s Fukushima Plant Has Been Leaking Contaminated Water “For 
2 Years,” REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2013, 4:12 AM), http://www. 
reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/japan-fukushima-water-idUST9N0F303V2013 
0807. 
101 See Is It Safe For Any of Fukushima’s 160,000 Nuclear Refugees To 
Return To Home?, TEN THOUSAND THINGS (Oct. 12, 2013, 2:46 PM), 
http://tenthousandthingsfromkyoto.blogspot.com/2013/10/is-it-safe-for-any-of-
fukushimas-160000.html. This number includes 83,000 refugees who resided 
within an exclusion zone around Fukushima, and—as of October 2013—this 
includes one third of 70,000 residents outside the exclusion zone who have not 
relocated to their homes. Id.  
102 Justin McCurry, Fukushima Two Years On: The Largest Nuclear 
Decommissioning Finally Begins, THE GUARDIAN (March 6, 2013, 12:15 EST), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/mar/06/fukushima-nuclear-
decommissioning-plant-safety. 
103 Tom Zeller, Jr., U.S. Nuclear Plants Have Same Risks, and Backups, as 
Japan Counterparts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2011, at A10, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/world/asia/14industry.html. 
104 Id. 
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“tsunami-prone coastlines or near earthquake faults, aging plants 
and backup electrical systems that rely on diesel generators and 
batteries that could fail in extreme circumstances.”105 
In addition to the aforementioned severe accidents, there have 
been numerous smaller nuclear reactor accidents, which 
“involve[d] a loss of life or more than $50,000 in damages.”106 As 
of 2010 there have been ninety-nine such accidents at nuclear 
power plants worldwide, with fifty-seven percent of all nuclear-
related accidents occurring within the U.S.107 Additionally, based 
on NRC records, “there were 56 serious [safety] violations at 
[U.S.] nuclear power plants from 2007 to 2011.”108 
 
D. SNF-Related Malfunctions at Nuclear Sites 
 
Maintaining the SNF containment system requires both a 
properly functioning cooling system and the prevention of leakage 
of radioactive materials from the pools.109 There have been 
accidents involving failures of the cooling system, and with 
radioactive leakage.110 
There would be catastrophic results in the event of a spent fuel 
fire. According to Dr. Robert Alvarez, a Clinton Administration 
policy advisor, “[a] severe pool fire could render about 188 square 
miles around the nuclear reactor uninhabitable, cause as many as 
28,000 cancer fatalities, and spur $59 billion in damage.”111 During 
                                                            
105 Id. 
106 GAR SMITH, NUCLEAR ROULETTE: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE MOST 
DANGEROUS ENERGY SOURCE ON EARTH 34 (2012) (explaining Professor 
Benjamin Sovacool’s explanation of what should constitute a nuclear accident). 
107 Benjamin K. Sovacool, A Critical Evaluation of Nuclear Power and 
Renewable Electricity in Asia, 40 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 369, 379–80 (2010). 
108 Pierre Thomas, Jack Cloherty, & Andrew Dubbins, Records Show 56 
Safety Violations at U.S. Nuclear Power Plants in Past 4 Years, ABC NEWS 
(March 29, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/%20us-nuclear-power-plants-
safe/story?id=13246490. These violations include “missing or mishandled 
nuclear material, inadequate emergency plans, faulty backup power generators, 
corroded cooling pipes and even marijuana use inside a nuclear plant.” Id.  
109 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
110 See Alvarez, supra note 7, at 2. 
111 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 18 (explaining the results of a Brookhaven 
National Laboratory report for the NRC). 
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the Fukushima disaster, there was an explosion and a spent fuel 
fire at Fukushima Unit 4 following water loss at a spent fuel 
pool.112 The explosion destroyed the reactor building and 
disseminated radioactive debris.113 
The loss of large amounts of water from a spent fuel pool 
exposes the SNF to the atmosphere and thereby risks igniting a 
pool fire.114 According to the Institute for Policy Studies, “[o]ver 
the past 30 years, there have been at least 66 incidents at U.S. 
reactors in which there was a significant loss of spent fuel 
water.”115 For example, the Florida Power and Light’s spent fuel 
pool safety margin was below the allowable limit at a reactor near 
Miami for a five-year period before the NRC discovered and 
addressed the problem.116 
In addition, the leakage of radioactive materials is a common 
problem at U.S. nuclear power plants and spent fuel pools are one 
of the most prevalent sources of such leaking.117 The NRC reports 
that “at least forty-eight of sixty-five [U.S. commercial nuclear 
reactor] sites” have experienced tritium leakage.118 Although 
government standards permit a limited leak of radioactive water, 
the National Academy of Sciences reports that “any exposure to 
radioactivity . . . [can increase] cancer risk.”119  
                                                            
112 Id. at 4. The NRC observed that, “[g]iven the amount of decay heat in 
the fuel in the pool, it is likely that in the days immediately following the 
[Fukushima] accident, the fuel was partially uncovered.” U.S. NUCLEAR REG. 
COMM’N, RST ASSESSMENT OF FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI UNITS 13 (March 26, 
2011), available at http://cryptome.org/0003/daiichi-assess.pdf. As a result, 
there was a hydrogen explosion, and “a major source [sic] term release.” Id. 
113 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 4. 
114 INT’L PANEL ON FISSILE MATERIALS, supra note 45, at 5. 
115 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 2. 
116 Id. 
117 A Quarter of U.S. Nuclear Plants Leaking, CBSNEWS (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-quarter-of-us-nuclear-plants-leaking/. 
118 Radioactive Leaks Found at 75% of U.S. Nuke Sites, CBSNEWS (June 
20, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-20072884.html. 
Tritium is radioactive hydrogen, and primarily poses health risks when present 
in drinking water. Jeff Donn, PART II: AP IMPACT: Tritium Leaks Found at 
Many Nuke Sites, AP, http://www.ap.org/company/awards/part-ii-aging-nukes 
(last visited Oct. 7, 2014). 
119 Id. 
322 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
In summary, the environmental impacts of pool storage of SNF 
are formidable, threatening both the environment and public 
health. Although previous severe nuclear accidents involved the 
nuclear core, the consequences of an SNF-related accident are 
significant, potentially more catastrophic, and mandate the 
development of a robust long-term safety plan. 
 
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING RISKS OF NUCLEAR 
WASTE STORAGE 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In a seminal case, New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, the D.C. Circuit ruled that for the first time, the NRC 
must account for the possibility that a national geologic repository 
may never be built.120 The court directed the NRC to detail and 
assess the risks of permanent storage of SNF at nuclear power 
plants.121 Despite a judicial posture of deference to the NRC’s 
projections about nuclear waste storage,122 the D.C. Circuit ruled 
that the NRC’s findings in the Waste Confidence Decision Update 
in 2010 were inadequate because the NRC failed to discuss the 
possibility of storage without a permanent repository.123 The Waste 
Confidence Decision refers to the NRC’s reports about “the safety 
and environmental impacts of storing SNF beyond the license life 
for operations of a nuclear power plant.”124 The original WCD 
declared: 
1) Safe disposal in a mined geologic repository is 
technically feasible; 
2) Such a repository will be available by 2007–
2009; 
3) Waste will be managed safely until the 
repository is available; 
                                                            
120 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 483 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
121 Id.  
122 See supra Part II.C for discussion of judicial review of NEPA claims. 
123 New York, 681 F.3d at 478.  
124 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xxiii. 
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4) SNF can be stored safely at nuclear plants for at 
least thirty years beyond the licensed life of 
each plant; and 
5) Safe, independent storage will be made 
available if needed.125 
In the 2010 WCD Update, the NRC revised statement 2 to 
report that “a suitable repository will be available ‘when 
necessary’”; instead of the previous assurance of availability by 
2007–09.126 In addition, the NRC amended statement 4, extending 
the duration of safe SNF storage on site from thirty years to sixty 
years.127 
 
B. National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) 
 
In New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the D.C. 
Circuit ruled that the NRC must comply with NEPA in assessing 
the environmental impacts of long-term SNF storage without the 
Yucca Mountain repository.128 NEPA requires federal agencies to 
issue an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)129 when reporting 
on “major Federal action[s] significantly affecting the quality of 
the human environment.”130 This statement must include “any 
adverse environmental effects,” “alternatives to the proposed 
action,” and requires federal agencies to report “the environmental 
impacts to the public.”131 Alternatively, a federal agency can 
prepare an environmental assessment to determine if the federal 
action will have a significant environmental impact and can release 
a Finding of No Significant Impact if the agency concludes that an 
EIS is unwarranted.132  
An agency’s draft GEIS must abide by the requirements of an 
                                                            
125 New York, 681 F.3d at 475.  
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 474. 
129 See Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1–.5 (2005). 
130 New York, 681 F.3d at 476–77 (quoting National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012)).  
131 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2014). 
132 New York, 681 F.3d at 476. 
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EIS “to the fullest extent possible.”133 The draft GEIS is 
considered “generic” because the projections pertain to all 
commercial nuclear waste storage sites rather than to specific 
sites.134 
 
C. Judicial Review of NEPA Claims 
 
Courts review claims under NEPA based on a highly 
deferential standard of review. In accordance with section 10 of the 
Administrative Procedural Act (APA),135 courts will “hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with the law.”136 Courts tend to defer 
to an agency’s conclusions137 so long as the agency provides a 
“credible rationale and a substantial factual basis” when it presents 
findings in its specialized area.138 In particular, when applying the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, courts “consider whether an 
agency decision is based on . . . relevant factors and whether there 
has been a clear error of judgment.”139 For example, in Baltimore 
Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,140 
                                                            
133 Regulations for Implementing NEPA, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (2005). 
134 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24. 
135 See generally Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843 (1984) (explaining the high level of deference given to agency actions). 
136 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2014). 
137 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 708 F.3d 63, 
73 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing the judicial posture of deference to agency 
findings, particularly when reviewing NRC decisions); see also Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843 (noting that courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of an 
ambiguous statutory matter provided that the agency’s interpretation is 
reasonable).  
138 See, e.g., N.J. Envtl. Fed’n v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 645 
F.3d 220, 230 (3d Cir. 2011). 
139 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411–
12, 416 (1971) (explaining that judicial review of agency actions under Section 
10 of the APA should entail “searching and careful” inquiry of the 
administrative record to ensure that agency decisions are not arbitrary and 
capricious).  
140 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 
(1983). 
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in 1983, notwithstanding the highly deferential standard of review, 
the D.C. Circuit held that an NRC report purporting to show the 
safety of its permanent storage plan must account for uncertainties 
regarding environmental impacts on a long-term basis.141 The 
Supreme Court reversed and held that the NRC’s finding that 
permanent storage of nuclear waste would not have a significant 
environmental impact constituted compliance under NEPA.142 The 
Court held that the NRC’s findings were sufficient and thereby 
merited deference under section 10 of APA.143 The Court reasoned 
that judicial inquiry of alleged violations of NEPA is limited to 
“determining if an agency adequately considered and disclosed the 
environmental impact of its actions.”144  
Notwithstanding the lenient standard applied to NEPA claims, 
the NRC’s environmental assessments “must be thorough and 
comprehensive.”145 In determining whether an agency complied 
with NEPA, the court requires that the agency “consider every 
significant aspect of the environmental impact of a proposed 
action”146 and “inform the public that it has indeed considered 
environmental concerns in its decisionmaking [sic] process.”147 
Pursuant to NEPA, an agency must “take a ‘hard look’ at the 
environmental consequences before taking a major action.”148 In 
particular, an EIS must be presented in a way that a layperson can 
“understand and consider meaningfully the factors involved.”149 
                                                            
141 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
685 F.2d 459, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). The NRC issued 
environmental data, finding that “[nuclear] wastes will have no effect on the 
environment after they are [permanently] sealed in salt mines,” and thus 
instructed licensing decisions to “conclusively assume that such wastes will emit 
no radiological effluents into the environment after final burial.” Id.  
142 Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 89. 
143 See id. 
144 Id. at 98. 
145 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 481 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
146 See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 97 (quoting Vt. Yankee 
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 
(1978)). 
147 See, e.g., id.  
148 Id. 
149 Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
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D. New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
 
1. History of WCDs 
 
The WCDs originated as a result of the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in 
Minnesota v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 1979, which 
required the NRC to assess whether a national repository would be 
established by 2007–09, and “if not, whether SNF can be stored 
safely at sites beyond those dates.”150 In 1984, The NRC provided 
its original WCD, concluding that a geologic repository would 
become available by 2007–09; it first amended the WCD to report 
availability by 2025, and that “SNF can be stored safely at nuclear 
reactor sites for at least thirty years beyond the licensed life of each 
plant.”151 In a further amendment, the NRC issued a WCD Update 
in 2010, which stated that a permanent repository would become 
“available ‘when necessary,’” instead of by a set deadline.152 In 
addition, the NRC extended the timeline for which SNF can be 
safely stored “without significant environmental impacts” to “at 
least 60 years beyond the licensed life for operation.”153 
 
2. New York v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 
 
Four states, the Prairie Island Indian community, and 
environmental groups challenged the merits of the NRC’s WCD 
Update and requested judicial review of the updated report.154 In 
2012, in New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the 
court held that the WCD Update constitutes a “major federal 
                                                            
869 F.2d 719, 737 (1989). 
150 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 474–75 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Minnesota v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 602 
F.2d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Waste Confidence Decision Update, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,037 (Dec. 23, 
2010) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
154 New York, 681 F.3d at 473.  
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action” under NEPA, on the grounds that the report will be the 
basis of nuclear power plant licensing decisions.155 The court 
thereby invalidated the WCD Update156 and directed the NRC to 
evaluate the environmental effects of continued SNF storage if a 
geologic repository is not established.157 Although the court’s 
review was governed by section 10 of APA, which is highly 
deferential to the agency’s decisions,158 the court would not defer 
to the NRC’s findings because it found that the WCD Update was 
too insubstantial; stating that “the Commission’s obligations under 
NEPA require a more thorough analysis than provided for in the 
WCD Update.”159 
The court emphasized that NEPA requires the NRC to assess 
risks involved based on “the probability of a given harm occurring 
and the consequences of that harm if it does occur.”160 In 
particular, the court specified that the NRC must assess the risks of 
SNF leakage into groundwater by factoring in the potential effects 
of sustained on-site storage into its evaluation.161 The court also 
called for the NRC to evaluate the risk of spent fuel pool fires,162 
which can occur if fuel rods are exposed to the air.163 The court’s 
ruling has had a major policy impact, requiring that the NRC 
account for environmental impacts of long-term nuclear waste 
storage, conceivably acknowledging that we are living in a post-
Fukushima world. 
Whereas the courts in Minnesota v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, and Baltimore Gas deferred to the NRC’s assurances 
that a permanent geologic repository would become available, the 
court in New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ruled 
that the WCD Update, which extended the NRC’s three-decade-
                                                            
155 Id. at 476. 
156 Id. at 481.  
157 Id. at 478. 
158 See discussion infra Part III.B.3. 
159 New York, 681 F.3d at 478.  
160 Id. at 479. 
161 Id. at 481. 
162 See id. at 479.  
163 Can Spent Fuel Pools Catch Fire?, FAIREWINDS ENERGY EDUC. (Aug. 
19, 2012), http://www.fairewinds.org/can-spent-fuel-pools-catch-fire/. 
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long assurance about the availability of an underground permanent 
repository,164 was no longer acceptable. The court mandated that 
the NRC produce a safe storage plan that recognized the possibility 
that the long-awaited permanent repository may never be 
constructed.165 
 
III. THE NRC’S DRAFT GEIS 
 
In response to New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, in August 2013, the NRC issued a draft GEIS, its 
report on the projected environmental risks of storing SNF without 
a permanent geologic repository.166 A mandatory public 
commenting period followed to encourage public input regarding 
the environmental assessment process.167 NEPA obligates the NRC 
to review the comments and respond in its final EIS as it deems 
necessary.168 The NRC also temporarily halted licensing and 
relicensing of nuclear power plants pending final EIS approval.169 
On August 26, 2014, the NRC unanimously approved a Continued 
Storage Rule which incorporates the findings of the draft GEIS.170 
Based on the NRC’s adoption of the Continued Storage Rule, the 
                                                            
164 New York, 681 F.3d at 475, 480–81.  
165 Id. at 478–79. 
166 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at iii. 
167 Id. at lxiii. See generally Purpose, 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1 (2005) (describing 
CEQ Regulations for Implementing NEPA and explaining that the purpose of 
the public commenting period is to ensure public input in the environmental 
assessment process); Response to Comments, 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4 (outlining how 
the NRC is to review the comments and respond as it deems necessary in the 
final EIS). 
168 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1. 
169 Id. at xxvi.  
170 NRC Approves Final Rule on Spent Fuel Storage and Ends Suspension 
of Final Licensing Actions for Nuclear Plants and Renewals, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N (Aug. 26, 2014) http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/ 
docs/ML1423/ML14238A326.pdf; Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Waste is Allowed 
Above Ground Indefinitely, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/30/us/spent-nuclear-fuel-is-allowed-to-be-
stored-above-ground.html?_r=0. 
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NRC lifted its suspension of final licensing decisions for prolonged 
operation of thirty-four nuclear reactors at twenty-two sites.171 
 
A. The NRC’s Assessment of Environmental Impacts in 
the Draft GEIS 
 
In the draft GEIS, the NRC presents its assessment of the risks 
of environmental impacts of SNF storage for each of three 
timeframes: short-term, long-term, and indefinite.172 Acording to 
the draft GEIS, prior to the starting point of these timeframes, a 
nuclear reactor is licensed for up to eighty years.173 Based on the 
NRC’s definition, short-term storage begins at the end of the 
reactor license period and extends for an additional sixty years.174 
The NRC defines long-term storage as a period of time “for 100 
years beyond the short-term storage timeframe.”175 The indefinite 
storage timeframe begins at the end of the long-term storage 
timeframe, and extends for a limitless period of time, based on the 
“[assumption] that [no permanent] repository becomes 
available.”176 These timeframes are summarized in the following 
table: 
                                                            
171 Memorandum and Order on Continued Storage, U.S. NUCLEAR 
REGULATORY COMM’N, 1–3, 12 (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.nrc.gov/ 
reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/orders/2014/2014-08cli.pdf. 
172 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xxv. 
173 Id. at 12.  
174 Prior to “short-term SNF storage,” a reactor is licensed for up to eighty 
years. Id. at xxv. 
175 Id. at 12. However, SNF storage may begin as early as four years after 
granting the initial license. See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 
32. 
176 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xxvii. 
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Timeframe 
 
NRC’s Definition Age of SNF at End of 
Timeframe 
Short-Term 
Storage 
60 year period  
after the licensed 
operating life of a 
reactor 
60177 - 140178 years 
Long-Term 
Storage 
100 year period 
after the short-term 
storage timeframe 
160 - 240 years 
Indefinite Storage 
 
Storage for the 
indefinite future 
Unlimited 
number of years 
  
For each timeframe, the NRC classifies and analyzes the 
environmental risk of SNF storage using the following terms: 
small, moderate, or large.179 A “small” risk is when 
“[e]nvironmental effects are not detectable or are so minor that 
they will neither destabilize nor noticeably alter any important 
attribute of the resource.”180 A “moderate” risk is when 
“environmental effects are sufficient to alter noticeably, but not to 
destabilize important attributes of the resource.”181 “Large” 
pertains to “environmental effects [that] are clearly noticeable and 
are sufficient to destabilize important attributes of the resource.”182 
The NRC conducted this analysis for each of nineteen resource 
areas,183 as shown in the table below. This framework for risk 
assessment provides the impetus for determining whether 
continued storage of nuclear waste is feasible.184 
                                                            
177 The low end of this SNF age range corresponds to fuel that was stored at 
the end of the eighty-year reactor license period. Id. 
178 The high end of this SNF age range corresponds to fuel that was stored 
at the beginning of reactor operations. Id. 
179 Id. at xxviii. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See id. at xxix. 
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Table 2- Environmental Impacts of At-Reactor Continued 
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
                                                            
185 “Environmental justice” pertains to “environmental impacts on minority 
and low-income populations.” Id. at xxvii, 3-8.  
186 “Historical and cultural resources” refers to historic sites that can be 
listed in the National Register of Historic Places, and includes places with 
cultural significance to Native Americans. Id. at 3–29. 
Resource Area Short-term 
Storage 
Long-term 
Storage 
Indefinite 
Storage 
Land Use SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Socioeconomics SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Environmental 
Justice185 
 
No disproportionately high and adverse impacts 
 
Air Quality SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Climate Change SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Geology and Soils SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Surface Water  
  Quality  
  Use 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
Groundwater 
  Quality 
  Use 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
Terrestrial 
Resources 
SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Aquatic Ecology SMALL SMALL SMALL 
 
Special Status 
Species and 
Habitats  
“determined as 
part of 
Endangered 
Species Act” 
Not likely to 
adversely  
affect 
Not likely to 
adversely 
affect 
Historic and  
Cultural 
Resources186 
 
SMALL 
SMALL, 
MODERATE,  
or LARGE 
SMALL, 
MODERATE, 
or LARGE 
Noise SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Aesthetics SMALL SMALL SMALL 
Waste    
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Although the NRC does not indicate why the resource areas are 
listed in this particular order,187 the list ranges from the relatively 
subtle, such as noise and aesthetics, to the most concerning—
nuclear waste management and public and occupational health—
which appear fifteenth and seventeenth on the list, respectively.188  
For most resource areas, the NRC projects that the risk of 
significant environmental impacts from SNF storage is small.189 
For the short-term timeframe, the NRC projects that the risk of 
environmental impacts is small for all seventeen resource areas.190 
For the long-term timeframe, the NRC finds that there is a small 
risk of environmental impact for all resource areas listed, except 
for a “small, moderate or large” risk for “historical and cultural 
resources.”191 For the indefinite timeframe, the NRC finds that the 
risks are the same as the risks during the long-term timeframe,192 
                                                            
187 See, e.g., id. at xxv, xxix. 
188 Id. at xlii–xliii. 
189 Id.  
190 Id. The remaining two resource areas have alternative designations, also 
indicating that the environmental risks will be insignificant. Id.  
191 Id. The remaining two resource areas have the same minimal risks as 
projected for short-term storage. Id. 
192 Id. at xliii. 
Management 
  LLW 
  Mixed Waste 
 
  Nonradioactive  
     Waste 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
SMALL to 
MODERATE 
SMALL to 
MODERATE 
Transportation 
  Traffic 
  Health Impacts 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
SMALL 
Public and 
Occupational 
Health 
 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
 
SMALL 
Accidents SMALL 
Terrorism 
Considerations 
 
SMALL 
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but indicates that sub-categories of waste management, which 
include SNF,193 would entail a “small to moderate” risk.194 For all 
timeframes, the NRC finds that public and occupational health 
risks are small. 195  
Most importantly, for the indefinite period, the NRC’s risk 
assessment supports its conclusion that a permanent geologic 
repository is no longer necessary. Based on the NRC’s findings for 
indefinite storage—a limitless time period—the risks will never be 
large.196 In particular, the NRC projects that the risks are minimal 
for the most critical resource areas—those pertaining to public 
health and welfare.197 The NRC “solves” the no-permanent-
repository problem by purporting to show that no matter what the 
timeframe, local storage is feasible. 
In the draft GEIS, in addition to providing assessments of 
environmental effects for on-site storage, the NRC provides 
parallel assessments of independent spent fuel storage facility 
(ISFSI) storage.198 An ISFSI is a facility where, after an initial 
period of pool storage and cooling, SNF is stored in dry concrete 
casks,199 as opposed to ongoing pool storage.200 According to the 
NRC, an ISFSI is “licensed separately from a nuclear power plant 
and [is] considered independent even though it may be located on 
the site of another NRC-licensed facility.”201 Storing SNF in 
ISFSIs rather than pools can thus be considered the NRC’s 
proposal to comply with NEPA’s requirement that an agency 
discuss “alternatives to the proposed actions.”202 In the draft GEIS, 
the NRC provides a separate risk assessment of ISFSI storage for 
each of the nineteen resource areas. The NRC determined that the 
                                                            
193 Id. at xxx. 
194 Id. at xliii. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. at xlii–xliii. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at liii–liv. 
199 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 35. 
200 Id. at 14. 
201 Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, 
http://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/faqs.html (last updated July 7, 
2014).  
202 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). 
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risks are generally small203 and on par with those of at-reactor SNF 
storage. This finding supports the NRC’s view that SNF storage 
can continue indefinitely without a permanent geologic repository. 
Whether SNF is stored at reactor sites or at ISFSIs, the NRC 
concludes that the risks will not be large.204 
 
B. The NRC’s Probabilistic Risk Assessment  
 
1. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Calculation 
 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a computational 
method used by the NRC in its draft GEIS to evaluate the risk of 
environmental impacts related to storage and management of 
SNF.205 Since nuclear accidents are infrequent, the NRC chose not 
to use the frequency of prior accidents to predict future 
accidents.206 Instead, the Commission used PRA, which relies on 
mathematical models to determine accident frequency207 and 
consequences.208  
The NRC’s PRA considers “what can go wrong, how likely is 
it, and what are the consequences.”209 To determine PRA–based 
risk, the NRC multiplies its estimate of the probability of the event 
(a very small number) by the consequence (a large number). Based 
on this method, the risk is found to be a small number.210 Thus, by 
using very small values for event frequencies, the calculated risk 
                                                            
203 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at liii. 
204 Id. at lviii. 
205 Risk Assessment in Regulation, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, 
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/risk-informed.html (last updated Nov. 
6, 2013). 
206 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 708 F.3d 63, 
71 (1st Cir. 2013). 
207 Risk Assessment in Regulation, supra note 196. 
208 American Nuclear Society, Apostolakis: On PRA, 43 NUCLEAR NEWS 
INTERVIEW 27, 27 (2000) available at http://www2.ans.org/pubs/magazines/ 
nn/docs/2000-3-2.pdf. 
209 Risk Assessment in Regulation, supra note 196. 
210 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 22, app. F-1. 
 
 
 THOUSANDS OF HALF-LIVES TO GO 335 
may be numerically small, even though the consequences can be 
significant.211 
In accordance with this method, in the draft GEIS, the NRC 
predicts minimal risk as a result of using very small event 
frequency values for accidents associated with SNF storage.212 For 
example, the NRC calculation of the results of a spent fuel pool 
fire indicated that up to 27,000 deaths might result, with a cost of 
up to $58.7 billion.213 The NRC determined that the chance of this 
event is remote, calculating two or fewer predicted events per 
million years, based on its PRA.214 The NRC thereby “finds that 
the environmental impacts from spent fuel pool fires are SMALL 
during the short-term storage timeframe.”215  
The NRC’s PRA also yields similar findings in calculating the 
risk of radiation release related to packaging of SNF into dry casks. 
The report indicates that the cancer fatality rate for initial cask 
loading with fuel would be about two cases per trillion years.216 
One trillion years is more than 200 times the estimated age of the 
Earth.217  
 
2. Conflict Between PRA-Based Predictions 
and Historical Data-Based Predictions 
 
Various experts have claimed that the NRC’s PRA 
methodology is fundamentally flawed because PRA is not based 
on historical assessment of risk, i.e., the assessment based on 
                                                            
211 Id. (“[T]he probability-weighted impacts, or risk, from a spent fuel pool 
fire for the short-term storage timeframe are SMALL because, while the 
consequences from a spent fuel pool fire could be significant and destabilizing, 
the probability of such an event is extremely remote.”). 
212 DAVID LOCHBAUM ET AL., FUKUSHIMA: THE STORY OF A NUCLEAR 
ACCIDENT 192 (2014). 
213 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at app. F-4. 
214 Id. tbl.F-1. 
215 Id. at app. F-12. 
216 Id. at app. B-14. 
217 The age of the Earth is approximately 4.55 billion years. Paul S. 
Braterman, How Science Figured Out the Age of Earth, SCI. AM. (Oct. 20, 
2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-science-figured-out-the-
age-of-the-earth/. 
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accidents that have already happened.218 For example, based on 
PRA modeling, the reactor core meltdowns at Fukushima were 
predicted to occur extremely infrequently,219 i.e., once per one 
million years to once per ten million years of reactor operation;220 
which contrasts with the historical reality: three core melt-downs at 
Fukushima in 2011.221 According to nuclear engineer Arnie 
Gundersen, “the lesson of real life disagrees with the lessons of the 
PRA.”222 Gundersen’s lessons of real life are the historical 
assessment. He goes on to explicitly state the difference between 
the historical prediction and the PRA-based prediction for reactor 
catastrophes:  
In the last thirty-five years we’ve had five 
meltdowns: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and three 
at Fukushima. So if you put thirty-five in the 
numerator and five in the denominator, you come 
up with an accident about every seven years.223 
Gundersen further states that his calculation indicating a 
historically-based prediction of one meltdown per seven years 
ignores about one dozen other meltdowns that occurred before 
Three Mile Island.224  
Although Gundersen specifically addressed nuclear reactor 
meltdowns, his statement addresses the general unreliability of the 
PRA methodology. PRA methodology for predicting SNF safety 
entails the same limitations as PRA methodology for predicting 
reactor safety. For example, the NRC’s calculated spent fuel pool 
                                                            
218 See Arnie Gundersen, Chief Eng’r at Fairewinds Assoc., Address at the 
Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Ongoing Lessons for New York Panel at the 92nd 
Street Y (Oct. 8, 2013), available at http://www. 
fairewinds.org/fukushima-daiichi-nuclear-accident-ongoing-lessons/.   
219 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FUKUSHIMA 
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT FOR IMPROVING SAFETY OF U.S. NUCLEAR PLANTS app. I-3 
(2014). 
220 Id. 
221 Yoko Wakatsuki, New Radioactive Water Leak at Japan’s Fukushima 
Daiichi Plant, CNN (Feb. 20, 2014, 7:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2014/02/19/world/asia/japan-fukushima-daiichi-water-leak/. 
222 Gundersen, supra note 218. 
223 Id. 
224 Id.; Sovacool, supra note 107. 
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fire frequency—which indicates two or fewer expected events per 
million years225—contrasts with the observation that there has 
already been one pool fire in 2011 at the Fukushima site.226 
 
3. Judicial Review of the NRC’s PRAs 
 
For the few cases that review the NRC’s PRAs, the courts’ 
assessments are governed by section 10 of APA,227 which is highly 
deferential to agencies such as the NRC.228 Because PRA is based 
on complex technical methods,229 courts are particularly inclined to 
defer to the NRC’s PRA findings.230 However, courts reviewed 
PRA methodology in both Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission231 and Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,232 with contrasting results. Both 
cases involved judicial review of the NRC’s decisions to forgo 
further safety assessments at nuclear power plants on the basis of 
its optimistic PRA findings.233 Whereas the Third Circuit in 
Limerick refused to defer to the NRC’s safety assurances based on 
the PRA,234 the First Circuit in Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission deferred to the NRC’s PRA-based 
                                                            
225 See supra Part III.B.1.  
226 Alvarez, supra note 7, at 4. The historical model indicates an event 
frequency of one event per less than seventy years. See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 19. 
227 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 708 F.3d 
63, 73–76 (1st Cir. 2013) (applying this “arbitrary and capricious” standard in 
assessing the NRC’s PRA-based findings). 
228 See, e.g., id. at 73 (explaining that this highly deferential standard of 
review is “particularly marked with regards to NRC actions” which are based on 
technical findings). 
229 Risk Assessment in Regulation, supra note 205. 
230 See, e.g., Massachusetts, 708 F.3d at 73–76 (deferring to the NRC’s 
PRA-based results on the grounds that the NRC’s findings are based on the 
agency’s expertise). 
231 Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n 869 
F.2d 719, 719 (3d Cir. 1989). 
232 Massachusetts, 708 F.3d at 63. 
233 See Limerick, 86 F.2d at 727; see also Massachusetts, 708 F.3d at 69–
71. 
234 Limerick, 869 F.2d at 736. 
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findings.235 
In Limerick236 in 1989, the Third Circuit recognized the 
limitations of the NRC’s PRA calculations.237 The views of 
dissenting NRC Commissioners bolstered the court’s skepticism. 
NRC Commissioner Dr. Victor Gilinsky noted that PRAs “are 
based on uncertain and unreliable calculational [sic] 
techniques.”238 NRC Commissioner James Asselstine further 
explained that “the unreliability of PRA analysis precluded 
confidence in the NRC’s judgment about reactor safety.”239 
The court applied careful scrutiny in reviewing the NRC’s 
PRA. It rejected the NRC’s finding—that it need not review severe 
accident mitigation design alternatives (SAMDAs)240 in its 
decision to license Limerick nuclear power plant because its PRA 
indicated that “existing plants pose no undue risk to public health 
and safety.”241 The court thereby held that the NRC violated 
NEPA242 explaining that the NRC’s PRA is unreliable and 
therefore could not be a justifiable basis for its refusal to consider 
SAMDAs.243 The court was also mindful that the NRC’s decision 
to disregard SAMDAs was issued following the Three Mile Island 
Accident.244 The court noted that the “Limerick plant is twenty-
five miles from Philadelphia,”245 and recognized the heightened 
risks of operating a nuclear power plant in the vicinity of a major 
city.246 Based on the dissenting Commissioners’ opposition to 
                                                            
235 Massachusetts, 708 F.3d at 73. 
236 Limerick, 869 F.2d at 719. 
237 Id. at 727 & n.5. 
238 Id. at 727 n.5 (quoting Dr. Victor Gilinsky, Safety Goal Development 
Program, 48 Fed. Reg. 10772-02 (March 14, 1983)). 
239 Id. at 727. 
240 SAMDAs refer to “possible plant design modifications that are intended 
. . . to lessen the severity of the impact of a[] [nuclear] accident should one 
occur.” Id. at 731. 
241 Id. at 727. 
242 Id. at 743. 
243 Id. at 743. 
244 Id. at 726. 
245 Id. at 722. 
246 Id. at 738–39. 
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PRA, the recent disaster at nearby Three Mile Island, and 
Limerick’s proximity to Philadelphia, the court recognized that the 
NRC’s PRA-based assurances were inadequate.247  
However, in Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission248 in 2013, the First Circuit employed a more 
deferential approach to the NRC. In light of the Fukushima 
disaster, Massachusetts petitioned the NRC to revise its risk 
assessment as stated in a prior EIS.249 This prior EIS would inform 
the relicensing decision for the Pilgrim nuclear power plant.250 The 
NRC denied Massachusetts’ petition based on its conviction that 
PRA is more accurate than “direct experience” prediction based on 
the history of prior accidents.251 The court affirmed the NRC’s 
denial of Massachusetts’ petition,252 rejecting Massachusetts’ 
contention that the NRC should have employed a direct experience 
model to estimate nuclear reactor meltdown frequency.253 The 
direct experience model determines core meltdown frequency “by 
taking five historical core damage events (Three Mile Island, 
Chernobyl, and three units at Fukushima) and dividing that number 
by the number of operating years of all nuclear power plants 
worldwide.”254 Based on this calculation, “the frequency of core 
damage events is approximately ten times higher” than the NRC’s 
PRA estimate.255 However, the court accepted the NRC’s 
contention that five accidents do not constitute enough historical 
data to make a more reliable model than PRA.256 The court 
                                                            
247 See id. at 722, 726–27 (considering these factors in rejecting the NRC’s 
PRA-based assessment). 
248 Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 708 F.3d 63 (1st 
Cir. 2013). 
249 Id. at 66. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 75–76. 
252 Id. at 78. 
253 Id. at 75. 
254 Id. at 70. Fukushima is considered as three events because reactors at 
buildings 1, 3, and 4 exploded. See LOCHBAUM ET AL., supra note 212, at 74, 80, 
265.  
255 Massachusetts, 708 F.3d at 75. 
256 Id. at 76. 
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accordingly deferred to the NRC’s methodology under section 10 
of APA’s standard of review.257 
The court’s ruling in Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission amounted to a refusal to consider the increased 
persuasiveness of the historical method of risk analysis, which now 
includes three additional reactor meltdowns at Fukushima.258 
Whereas the court in Limerick adopted a probing inquiry of 
PRA,259 the court in Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission adhered to a deferential approach; in the latter case, 
the court refused to accept the state’s arguments that in light of the 
Fukushima disaster, the probability of either a core meltdown or 
SNF accident was higher than estimated by the pre-Fukushima 
EIS.260 
 
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE DRAFT GEIS  
 
The NRC’s projections in the draft GEIS are inadequate on 
several grounds. First, the NRC’s PRA assessments entail a gross 
underestimate of the risks involved with sustained SNF storage,261 
and the reported findings lack sufficient clarity. Second, the draft 
GEIS does not comport with NEPA’s requirement to sufficiently 
inform the public about environmental impacts of agency 
actions.262 Finally, the findings in the draft GEIS amount to a 
fundamental change of the NRC’s position: for decades, the 
Commission based its position on the premise that a permanent 
geologic repository was necessary;263 it has now taken the position 
that a plan without a repository is feasible, but has failed to 
account for this change of position.  
 
 
                                                            
257 See id. at 75.  
258 See Gundersen, supra note 218. 
259 Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n 869 
F.2d 719, 736–41 (3d Cir. 1989). 
260 Massachusetts, 708 F.3d at 75. 
261 See, e.g., DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xlii–xliii. 
262 See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 
U.S. 87, 100–01 (1983). 
263 See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 20. 
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A. Flawed Risk Assessment 
 
The NRC’s risk assessment is flawed because it is based on 
periods of storage far longer than what has ever been 
accomplished.264 Because the operation of nuclear plants generates 
byproducts that remain radioactive for thousands of years,265 safe 
SNF storage must match this extended time period. In the draft 
GEIS, the NRC projects that SNF can be stored in the vicinity of 
reactors for an unlimited period of time.266 However, SNF has 
never been stored for more than approximately seventy years.267 
As a result, NRC’s statements about long-term and unlimited-term 
at-reactor storage entail a high degree of uncertainty. In Baltimore 
Gas, the Court’s acceptance of the NRC’s assertion that a 
permanent geologic repository would become available 
demonstrates the fallacy of relying on the NRC’s projections 
without further probing.268 
 
B. Thwarting of Meaningful Public Understanding 
 
Risk presentation in the draft GEIS contains 
oversimplifications and gross underestimates. The NRC’s 
designation of the terms small, medium, and large269 is too vague 
to allow for understanding of the risk of continued SNF storage. 
This presentation therefore runs contrary to NEPA’s requirement 
that the agency inform the public of potential environmental 
impacts of a proposed action.270 As the First Circuit discussed in 
Limerick, this requirement calls for the agency to provide a report 
that allows the public to consider critically and substantially the 
environmental impacts involved. 271 
                                                            
264 See, e.g, DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xxvi. 
265 Busby, supra note 52, at 453–54. 
266 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xlii–xliii. 
267 See source cited supra note 28. 
268 See id. (accepting the NRC’s finding that a permanent geologic 
repository would become available). 
269 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xxviii; see also discussion supra at Part 
II. 
270 See, e.g., Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 91. 
271 Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 
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The NRC website also reflects a pattern of understatement of 
environmental risks.272 The risk assessments are overly optimistic 
in light of prior experience with nuclear accidents273 and the 
inherent hazards of storing SNF.274 The NRC’s explanation of risk 
distorts the impact of an accident, which undermines the public’s 
understanding of risks involved. The NRC states: “PRA might 
estimate that an accident would create one chance in a million that 
a person living near the plant would experience radiation exposure 
equivalent to a chest x-ray, and one chance in a billion that some 
people would develop cancer over the next 50 years.”275 The words 
“might estimate” are misleading because the NRC’s statement 
implies a degree of risk that is much lower than the risk determined 
from prior accidents or from the Commission’s own risk 
calculations. 276 In actuality, accidents with far greater radiation 
exposure than “equivalent to a chest x-ray” and increased cancer 
rates in excess of “one chance in a billion” have occurred.277 
According to The International Journal of Cancer, 
Chernobyl may have caused about 1,000 cases of 
thyroid cancer and 4,000 cases of other cancers in 
Europe, representing about 0.01% of all incident 
cancers since the accident. Models predict that by 
2065 about 16,000 cases . . . of thyroid cancer and 
25,000 . . . cases of other cancers may be expected 
due to radiation from the accident . . . .278 
Furthermore, the NRC’s statement that an accident would 
result in a risk that “some people would develop cancer over the 
next 50 years,” contrasts sharply with the Commission prediction, 
in the draft GEIS, of an expected 20,000 to 27,000 deaths from 
                                                            
869 F.2d 719, 736–41 (1989). 
272 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xlii–xliii, liii–liv. 
273 For discussion of nuclear accidents, see supra Part I.C. 
274 For discussion of the hazards of SNF storage, see supra Part I.A. 
275 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), supra note 77. 
276 Limerick, 869 F.2d at 739. 
277 See supra Part I.C for discussion of nuclear accidents. 
278 Elisabeth Cardis et al., Estimates of the Cancer Burden in Europe from 
Radioactive Fallout from the Chernobyl Accident, 119 INT’L J. CANCER 1224, 
1224 (2006). 
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radiation release in the event of a spent fuel fire.279 Recalling the 
format of the PRA calculation in the case of an SNF accident,280 
the risk evaluation is performed by multiplying the chance of an 
event (i.e. the chance of a spent fuel pool fire) by a calculated 
dollar-based consequence of the event (i.e. the cost based on lives 
lost).281 This cost is determined by valuing a human life at one to 
three million dollars.282 The draft GEIS cost determination for an 
SNF accident is at least $55.7 billion,283 which is consistent with a 
cost per life of about two million (27,000 deaths multiplied by $2 
million). The NRC uses the PRA methodology to justify the 
additional arithmetic step of multiplying the $55.7 billion cost by 
the PRA estimate of the likelihood of the event: two to 2.4 fires per 
reactor per million years.284 The NRC thereby factors in this very 
low value, which it claims is the likelihood of the event 
(approximately two per million years) and concludes that “the 
environmental impacts from spent fuel pool fires are SMALL.”285 
By claiming that PRA legitimizes this multiplication step (i.e. 
multiplying by the fraction 2/1,000,000), the NRC justifies its 
finding that the risk is small, even though 20,000 or more lives are 
at stake.286 
The NRC’s selection and presentation of another exemplary 
case involving an oversimplified version of a risk calculation is 
also deceptive. The NRC states: “[c]ombining the probability of an 
accident with its consequences gives us a measure of risk. For 
instance, the consequences of a large meteor striking your house 
                                                            
279 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at app. F-4 tbl.F-1. 
280 See supra Part III.B.1 and accompanying text. 
281 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at app. F-2.1 (located on page 542). “The 
probability-weighted consequence [risk] is computed by multiplying a 
consequence, such as cumulative dose, cost to the local economy or area of land 
contamination, by the probability of the accident’s occurrence.” Id. at app. F-2.1. 
The NRC equates the term “risk” with probability-weighted consequence. Id. at 
app. F-1. 
282 LOCHBAUM ET AL., supra note 212, at 193. 
283 DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at app. F-4 tbl.F-1., F-7. 
284 See id. at F-1, F-4 tbl.F-1 (applying PRA and showing the accident 
frequency in scientific notation).  
285 Id. at F-12. 
286 See id. at lix, F-1. 
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would be devastating, but the risk is low because the probability of 
such an accident is very small.”287  
The meteor example is obfuscating for two reasons. First, the 
example conflates the chance of death due to a meteor strike with 
the chance of death due to a nuclear disaster.288 Second, the 
example also shows how great personal and societal impacts can 
be dramatically downplayed by assigning dollar values to them 
that are essentially nullified in the NRC’s risk assessment: 
multiplying the dollar cost by an extremely small number (the 
purported event frequency, which in the exemplary case, is the 
chance of a meteor hitting one’s home).289 According to former 
NRC chairman Gregory Jaczko: 
There will be ways that Mother Nature, that human 
mistakes and errors will lead to these kinds of 
severe accidents at nuclear power plants. But 
moreover, what this accident is telling us is that 
society does not accept the consequences from these 
severe accidents. Society does not ultimately find it 
acceptable to evacuate hundreds of thousands of 
people, to have areas of land be permanently 
contaminated, to spend close to half-a-trillion or 
more dollars to deal with the aftermath of an 
accident at a facility that is simply designed to 
generate electricity.290 
Jaczko’s view, as stated above, indicates that the NRC’s risk 
equation, which is said to demonstrate a low value of risk, does not 
comport with society’s evaluation of risk. If Jaczko is correct that 
society finds Fukushima-level events unacceptable, the NRC’s risk 
equation yields false results.  
As the D.C. Circuit explained in New York v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, the risks of SNF storage include the risk 
                                                            
287 Id. 
288 See LOCHBAUM ET AL., supra note 212, at 192 (explaining that the 
NRC’s likening the chances of losing one’s life from a nuclear accident to a 
meteor hitting someone as misleading). 
289 Id. at 192–93. 
290 Gregory Jaczko, Cong. Advisory Panelist for the Nat’l Nuclear Sec. 
Admin., Address at the Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Ongoing Lessons for New 
York Panel at the 92nd Street Y (Oct. 8, 2013). 
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of pool fires and radioactive leakage into groundwater.291 
However, on the NRC website, illustrative examples involve the 
risks of unicycling, skydiving, and climbing Mount Everest.292 The 
NRC fails to indicate that these examples entail (a) in the cases of 
the unicycle and extreme sports, a personal choice to assume the 
risk and (b) in the case of a meteor strike, a situation in which the 
person or society at risk cannot make a decision to avoid the 
catastrophic event. None of these NRC examples reflect former 
NRC Chief Commissioner Jaczko’s view that the acceptance of 
extreme risk must be a societal decision. 
 
C. Philosophic Inconsistency Regarding National 
Permanent Storage Facility 
 
The NRC’s projection in its draft GEIS that SNF storage 
without a permanent repository is safe does not comport with its 
prior understanding that continued SNF storage without a 
permanent geologic repository could not be considered a safe 
option.293 The unavailability of a permanent repository has not 
rendered local SNF storage safer than previously expected. 
Moreover, the NRC does not account for its altered position that 
local storage is feasible and safe.294 For thirty-two years—from the 
time of Minnesota v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission through 
New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission—the NRC 
provided official assurances that licensing decisions could proceed 
with the assumption that a permanent repository would become 
available.295 The assurances were the cornerstone of the original 
                                                            
291 New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 681 F.3d 471, 478–79 
(D.C. Cir. 2012). 
292 Risk Assessment in Regulation, supra note 205. 
293 BLUE RIBBON COMM’N REPORT, supra note 5, at 27 (“[D]eep geologic 
disposal is the scientifically preferred approach [that] has been reached by every 
expert panel that has looked at the issue . . . .” ). See supra Part I.B for 
discussion of the permanent storage option. 
294 See DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xxiii–xxiv (explaining that the draft 
GEIS is being issued in response to New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission without further explanation for the NRC’s revised position). 
295 New York, 681 F.3d at 475. 
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WCD in 1984 and each of the updates through 2010;296 which 
were to be realized by the NRC’s plan that a permanent repository 
would store nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain for one million 
years.297 In the roughly one year period between the D.C. Circuit’s 
ruling in New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and 
publication of the draft GEIS,298 the NRC determined that a 
permanent repository was no longer necessary and that storage for 
an unlimited time was possible without this repository.299 The draft 
GEIS describes no technological breakthrough that supports this 
change in position.  
 
V. THE DRAFT GEIS DOES NOT WARRANT DEFERENCE 
 
The NRC’s draft GEIS should be unacceptable notwithstanding 
a highly deferential standard of review under section 10 of the 
APA.300 The NRC’s findings should be considered “arbitrary and 
capricious”301 given the speculative basis for its risk assessment. 
The courts are equipped to evaluate the NRC’s PRA findings, as 
shown in Limerick, in which dissenting NRC Commissioners 
provided expert information.302  
The Commission’s projections that SNF can be safely stored 
without Yucca Mountain are speculative. The NRC purports to 
demonstrate in its draft GEIS that a permanent repository is 
unnecessary because of its conclusion that interminable local 
                                                            
296 Id.  
297 Waste Confidence- Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 56776 (proposed Sept. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51); see 
also Alex Funk & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Wasted Opportunities: Resolving the 
Impasse in United States Nuclear Waste Policy, 34 ENERGY L.J. 113, 145 
(2013).  
298 See DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24. 
 
299 See id. at xxii. 
300 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 708 F.3d 
63, 73 (1st Cir. 2013). 
301 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2014). 
302 See, e.g., Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n 869 F.2d 719, 725 (3d Cir. 1989) (discussing comments of dissenting 
NRC Commissioners). 
 THOUSANDS OF HALF-LIVES TO GO 347 
storage of SNF is a safe option.303 The NRC now claims that 
nuclear facilities throughout the United States can accomplish what 
Yucca Mountain was intended to do—provide permanent safe 
storage of nuclear waste.304 
The courts should regard the NRC’s risk assessments in the 
draft GEIS as speculative. The court in Limerick recognized that 
significant uncertainties abound in using the NRC’s PRA 
methodology,305 which is the foundation of risk evaluation in the 
draft GEIS. As detailed in Part III, it is crucial that courts consider 
the frequency of prior nuclear accidents rather than PRA-based 
frequency predictions.306 According to nuclear expert Gundersen:  
The NRC says that the chance of a nuclear accident 
is about one in a million. With about 400 operating 
nuclear reactors [worldwide], if you put one million 
in the numerator and 400 in the denominator, you 
wound [sic] up with an accident about every 2500 
years. So from the time the Acropolis was built until 
now, there would be one nuclear accident using 
those numbers. The NRC uses a technique called 
probabilistic risk assessment to come up with that 
number.307 
Gundersen indicates that “based on five actual meltdowns in the 
past thirty-five years, the actual accident rate is one per seven 
years” in contrast to the PRA-based prediction of one event per 
2,500 years.308 
Courts should be especially circumspect in accepting a 
conclusion that the consequences of a nuclear accident are small.309 
Former NRC Chairman Jaczko discussed this concern in 
conjunction with the Fukushima accident.310 According to Robert 
                                                            
303 See DRAFT GEIS, supra note 24, at xlii–xliii, liii–liv (indicating that the 
risks of environmental impacts of permanent storage are generally small). 
304 Id. at xxii. 
305 Limerick, 869 F.2d at 726. 
306 See discussion supra Part III.A, B.2. 
307 Gundersen, supra note 218. 
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309 See discussion supra Part IV (describing inadequacies of NRC’s 
evaluation methods). 
310 See supra Part IV.B. 
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Alvarez, Senior Scholar at the Institute for Policy Studies: 
[A pool fire would] . . . release catastrophic 
amounts of radioactivity. We estimated that a single 
pool fire in the United States at a typical reactor 
could render an area uninhabitable substantially 
[four to five times] greater than that created by the 
Chernobyl accident. The Chernobyl accident 
created an area of uninhabitability that’s roughly the 
size of half of New Jersey.311 
The greater the gap between NRC accident predictions and the 
actual occurrence of nuclear accidents, the less deference can and 
should be expected. The Fukushima accident in 2011—the type 
that had been predicted to occur approximately once per million 
years312—increased this gap. The D.C. Circuit’s decision to 
invalidate the 2010 WCD Update in New York v. U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission313 conceivably was a response to the 
previous year’s Fukushima disaster. The draft GEIS, with its 
speculative PRA assessments and implicit denial of its thirty-year 
position that a permanent repository is necessary, should 
discourage courts from restoring the highly deferential approach. 
This ongoing gap and the setback for the NRC in New York v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission will likely spawn future legal 
challenges.314  
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Inst. for Policy Studies, Earthbeat at the Real News Network (Mar. 2, 2011). 
 
312 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FUKUSHIMA 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The NRC failed to comply with the D.C. Circuit’s mandate in 
New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
Notwithstanding the NRC’s complex and detailed analysis in the 
draft GEIS, the report does not provide a reliable evaluation of the 
risk and environmental impacts of a major nuclear disaster related 
to above ground nuclear waste storage. The NRC’s risk evaluation 
methodology is flawed with respect to each of two key issues: (1) 
determination of the probability of the occurrence of a disaster, and 
(2) determination of a reasonable method of arithmetically 
blending this probability with the associated environmental 
consequences.315 
In addition, The NRC violated NEPA by improperly reporting 
environmental risks to the public.316 The Commission has further 
strained credibility by (1) presenting misleading non-representative 
risk examples to the public and (2) altering a thirty-year position—
that the ultimate destination for SNF would be a permanent mined 
geologic storage site.317 Based on roughly seventy years of prior 
experience with SNF storage,318 the NRC claims that SNF can be 
stored at or near reactors for an eternity.319 
Given these inadequacies, the NRC’s waste management 
analysis and plans should be considered unacceptable, 
notwithstanding a highly deferential standard of review under 
section 10 of the APA.320 The post-Fukushima world demands a 
higher degree of judicial scrutiny of the NRC’s findings. 
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